UIC Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 4

Article 6

Summer 2017

Reasonable Doubt: Is it Defined by Whatever is at the Top of the
Google Page?, 50 J. Marshall L. Rev. 933 (2017)
Bobby Greene

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Bobby Greene, Reasonable Doubt: Is it Defined by Whatever is at the Top of the Google Page?, 50 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 933 (2017)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss4/6
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

REASONABLE DOUBT: IS IT DEFINED BY
WHATEVER IS AT THE TOP OF THE
GOOGLE SEARCH PAGE?
BOBBY GREENE
I.

PEOPLE V. DOWNS: A JURY’S CONFUSION ABOUT
REASONABLE DOUBT ....................................................... 933
A. “A Real Bind” ........................................................... 933
B. How Bound Are We? ............................................... 935
II. THE COURT’S VIEW, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSES, AND
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE (ABSENCE) OF A
DEFINITION ..................................................................... 936
A. The Historical Perspective and Governing Authority
in Illinois .................................................................. 936
B. How the United States Supreme Court and the Model
Penal Code Have Addressed Reasonable Doubt ... 938
C. The State Court Dilemma: Whether to Define
Reasonable Doubt for the Jury ............................... 941
D. Recent Illinois Cases Suggest Reasonable Doubt Is
Not Understood By Juries ...................................... 942
E. How Professionals Have Responded to Defining
Reasonable Doubt .................................................... 943
III. HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED THE GAME: THE
PREVALENCE OF THE SMARTPHONE ................................ 946
A. Is Reasonable Doubt Self-Defining? ....................... 947
B. Recent Cases of Jury Misconduct Suggest Reasonable
Doubt is Not Self-Defining ...................................... 950
C. Contemplating Change in Stare Decisis When Society
Changes Because of Technology ............................. 953
IV. LIFTING THE VEIL FOR THE CONFUSED JUROR ................. 957
V. CONCLUSION....................................................................... 962

I.

PEOPLE V. DOWNS: A JURY’S CONFUSION ABOUT
REASONABLE DOUBT
A. “A Real Bind”

Imagine, as the judge, you receive a note from the jury asking,
“What is your definition of reasonable doubt, 80%, 70%, 60%?” 1 You
are well aware that this is a standard less than reasonable doubt. 2
Furthermore, it is your duty as a judge to determine what the
particular confusion is and to provide further instruction when the
1. See People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 1, 69 N.E. 3d 784, 784 (holding
that court’s response of “We cannot give you a definition [of reasonable doubt]
it is your duty to define” to jury question asking for definition of “reasonable
doubt” did not violate the admonition against defining the term).
2. See People v. Downs, 2014 IL App (2d) 121156, ¶ 28, 11 N.E. 3d 869 rev’d
& remanded People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, 69 N.E. 3d 784 (reasoning “this
question proves that the jury was considering the concept of ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’ to be a level of confidence in the evidence somewhere between
60% and 80%. The question, at best, suggests that the jury was predisposed to
use a standard less than reasonable doubt. . . .”).
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jury delivers a particular question or requests clarification. 3 On the
other hand, Illinois has a 100-year precedent providing no definition
of reasonable doubt is to be given to the jury. 4 So, what are you left
to do? Let the jury decide a man’s fate in a murder trial using a
standard below that for reasonable doubt? 5 Or, risk committing
reversible error and aid the jury with its plea by providing them an
understanding of the elusive concept of reasonable doubt? 6
These were the facts before the trial court judge in People v.
Downs.7 There, the court responded to the jury, “We cannot give you
a definition [of reasonable doubt] it is your duty to define.”8
Remarkably, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree
murder after further deliberation.9
The defendant appealed and Second District Court of Appeals
reversed finding that the lower court’s reasonable doubt instruction
was deficient and resulted in in plain error. 10 The Second District
acknowledged only in a footnote in its opinion that “[t]he jury’s
question put the trial court in a real bind . . . .”11 The court further
explained the only answer that it could think of was “to tell the jury
that reasonable doubt is not defined as a percentage, but rather is
the highest standard of proof known in law . . . .” 12 However, in the
same breath, the appellate court admitted that after hearing the
oral arguments, the only recommended instruction that the court
suggested, would have also been error.13
As a result, the State appealed and the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the trial court's response to the jury’s
question (asking for a definition of “reasonable doubt”) did not
violate the well-established rule, barring the courts from defining
the term for a jury.14 In this holding, the Illinois Supreme court
resolved the appellant court split, whether it was error per se to ever
3. See Hunter v. Smallwood, 28 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391 (1975) (reasoning
“[e]ven where a situation is relatively clear to a trial court, in most cases it
would probably be more consistent with the ends of justice if the trial court
makes an attempt to clarify the instructions for the jury, or at least attempting
to understand the problem which is confusing the jurors.”).
4. See Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 24 (holding “In decisions dating back
more than 100 years, this court has consistently held that the term “reasonable
doubt” should not be defined for the jury, that the term, in fact, needs no
definition because the words themselves sufficiently convey its meaning.”).
5. Downs, 2014 IL App (2d) 121156.
6. See People v. Pledge, 2016 IL App (1st) 132200 at ¶ 10 (holding, “An
instruction on the concept of reasonable doubt is reversible error if the
instruction improperly minimized the State's burden of proof or attempted to
shift that burden to the defendant.”).
7. Downs, 2014 IL App (2d) 121156.
8. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 7.
9. Id.
10. Downs, 2014 IL App (2d) 121156 at ¶ 32.
11. Id. at ¶ 29. (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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instruct the jury about reasonable doubt if a jury asked the court to
define it.15

B. How Bound Are We?
This Comment addresses the State of Illinois’ minority view
that the term “reasonable doubt” is “self-defining” to a jury and that
“the words themselves sufficiently convey its meaning” in a society
that has easy access to Google.16 Part I of this Comment analyzes
People v. Downs to illustrate both a jury’s confusion as to reasonable
doubt and the inability for the court to aid the jury with a
description when needed. Part II of this Comment assesses the
historical perspective of reasonable doubt and the authority
governing Illinois, which has led Illinois courts to determine “it is
for the jury to collectively determine [or define] what reasonable
doubt is.”17 Part II will also look to the professional responsibility
of both judges and counsel in their attempt to deal with the absence
of a definition and the ambiguity of the term “reasonable doubt.”
This Comment will then discuss the impact the absence of a
definition has had on jurors in the jurisdictions like Illinois, while
illustrating how the advancement of technology has fundamentally
changed this issue. Part III analyzes whether the term “reasonable
doubt” is self-defining, and whether technological advances have
required Illinois courts to provide a jury instruction when the jury
asks for a definition of reasonable doubt. Finally, Part IV proposes
Illinois courts should advise juries what Illinois Supreme Court
Chief Judge George Cooke astutely pointed out over 100 years ago;
“the term ‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or different meaning in

15. See People v. Franklin, 2012 IL App (3d) 100618, ¶ 4, 970 N.E. 2d 1247,
1249 (holding that by the trial judge and the prosecutor telling the jurors:
“Beyond a reasonable doubt means beyond a reasonable doubt. It's what each
of you individually and collectively, as 12 of you, believe is beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . .” is plain error); accord. People v. Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019,
954 N.E. 2d 845; contra People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203, ¶ 28, 15
N.E. 3d 943, 949 (holding “[]it remains the law in Illinois that defining
“reasonable doubt” is discouraged but is not reversible error per se.”).
16. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 19 (noting “Illinois is among the
jurisdictions that do not define reasonable doubt.”).
17. See Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019 at ¶ 19 (citing the trial court
holding, “The trial court then proposed the following: “reasonable doubt is not
defined under Illinois law. It is for the jury to collectively determine what
reasonable doubt is.”); see Franklin, 2012 IL App (3d) 100618 at ¶ 4 (citing the
trial court, “During jury selection, the trial judge told the potential jurors:
‘Beyond a reasonable doubt means beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s what each of
you individually and collectively, as 12 of you, believe is beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”); see Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 at ¶ 1 (holding, “trial court’s
response to question from jury, that definition of reasonable doubt was for jury
to determine, did not violate due process.”).
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law than it has when used in any of the ordinary transactions or
affairs of life.”18

II.

THE COURT’S VIEW, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSES, AND
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE (ABSENCE) OF A
DEFINITION

An overview of the historical perspective of reasonable doubt
and the authority governing the Illinois courts is essential to the
understanding of the dilemma today. To illustrate the issue, a
comparison of jurisdictions with and without instructions for
reasonable doubt will be set out. Further, the summary will discuss
the professional response of the courtroom workgroup’s attempt to
deal with the absence of a definition, and conclude with a look at
the effect on jurors in those jurisdictions that do not have a
definition, including Illinois, and how the advancement of
technology, especially smartphones, has fundamentally changed
this issue.

A. The Historical Perspective and Governing Authority
in Illinois
Illinois has struggled with the concept of defining reasonable
doubt since shortly after admission into the Union and prior to its
own passing of the State Constitution. 19 As early as 1846, in one of
his State Supreme Court opinions, Justice Young discussed a
“technically incorrect” definition of reasonable doubt beginning the
long road of disapproval for defining the term reasonable doubt. 20
Just a few years later in 1850, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court crafted a well-known
18. See People v. Barkas, 99 N.E. 698, 702-703, 255 Ill. 516, 225 (1912)
(reasoning “The term ‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or different meaning in
law than it has when used in any of the ordinary transactions or affairs of life.
It is doubtful whether any better definition of the term can be found than the
words themselves.”).
19. Pate v. People, 8 Ill. 644, 661 (1846).
20. See id. at 661.
That there should be more than a bare probability of the defendant's
innocence; that they should have a reasonable doubt of his guilt, growing
out of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence; such a doubt as would
induce a reasonable man to say, I am not satisfied that the defendant is
guilty.’ This instruction, as it reads, is not technically correct, but by
inserting the word ‘possibility’ in the place of ‘probability,’ it would not
be obnoxious to any just exception. It is most likely that the court in
giving the explanation made use of the former word, and that in copying
the instructions in the bill of exceptions, the latter word was by mistake
inserted in lieu of it.
Id.

2017]

Reasonable Doubt: Is It Defined by Google?

937

definition for reasonable doubt, which served as a foundation for
more than a century as basis for most jurisdictions’ reasonable
doubt jury instructions.21 Justice Shaw posed the question of what
is reasonable doubt in his opinion of Commonwealth v. Webster:
Then, what is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used, probably
pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible
doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is
that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon
the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law independent of evidence
are in favor of innocence; and every person is presumed to be innocent
until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt
remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal.
For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one
arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more
likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish
the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty
that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the
reason and judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if
the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature,
should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would
exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.22

It was not until 1994, 144 years later, that the United States
Supreme Court suggested that “moral certainty,” which was a term
used in Justices Shaw’s definition, had a different common meaning
than it did during Shaw’s coinage and cautioned courts away from
such “antiquated” language from the 19th century. 23 Even though
the Supreme Court ultimately upheld Shaw’s definition, the Illinois
Supreme Court reasoned because a deficient reasonable doubt
instruction may warrant reversal,24 it is better left undefined.25 The

21. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 517 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (citing
Com. v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 296 (1850)).
22. Com., 59 Mass. at 320 (1850) (emphasis added).
23. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) Reasoning:
Words and phrases can change meaning over time: A passage generally
understood 1850 may be incomprehensible or confusing to a modern
juror. [W]e do not condone the use of the phrase [moral certainty]. As
modern dictionary definitions of moral certainty attest, the common
meaning of the phrase has changed since it was used in the Webster
instruction, and it may continue to do so to the point that it conflicts with
the Winship standard.
Id.

24. People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 32, 69 N.E. 3d 884, 794 (citing
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 (1993)).
25. Id.
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Illinois Supreme Court noted in Downs that there is a danger in
defining reasonable doubt.26 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned
that it violates a defendant’s due process rights to give any
instruction that defines reasonable doubt with “a reasonable
likelihood” that the jury understood the definition to permit a
conviction of “proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.” 27

B. How the United States Supreme Court and the
Model Penal Code Have Addressed Reasonable
Doubt
The Supreme Court has visited the issue of reasonable doubt
in several cases for varying reasons. The Court first opined in 1954,
explaining that defining reasonable doubt does not aid the jury
because defining the term usually does not make it any clearer in
the minds of the jury.28
In 1962, the Model Penal Code arguably appeared to follow this
rationale and described the burden of proof for the prosecution as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt; however, it purposely excluded
any definition of the reasonable doubt standard. 29
In 1970, the Court mandated that the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of a charged offense in criminal proceedings.30 The Winship
standard,31 which is regarded by some as protecting a principle as
26. Id. at *3 (citing Victor, 511 U.S. at 1).
27. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 18.
28. Holland v. United States 348 U.S. 121 (1954), reh’g denied, 348 U.S. 932
(1955).
29. See Matt Nichols, Victor v. Nebraska: The "Reasonable Doubt" Dilemma,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1709 (1995) (citing Brief for the United States at 9, Victor, 511
U.S. at 1) (quoting Model Penal Code § 1.12 cmt. 190 (1985) (“An amicus curiae
brief filed by the Solicitor General pointed out that the American Law Institute
specifically did not define reasonable doubt in the Model Penal Code because it
believed that defining the term “‘can add nothing helpful to the phrase.” ) Id.
30. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that “the reasonabledoubt standard of criminal law has constitutional stature and that juveniles,
like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond reasonable doubt when
they are charged with a violation of a criminal law.”).
31. See id. at 362.
Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been
assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required. [ ] The reasonable-doubt standard is
indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of
reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue. [ ] Moreover,
use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal
law. [ ] Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

2017]

Reasonable Doubt: Is It Defined by Google?

939

old as 1769, explains William Blackstone’s idea that “the law holds
that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffers.”32 There, the Court found that the reasonable
doubt standard is critical because it requires the jury to appreciate
that they must subjectively reach a level of certainty about the
essential facts to find the defendant guilty.33
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue
in Jackson v. Virginia, expanding the Winship standard to include
not only the inquiry of whether the jury was appropriately
instructed on the reasonable doubt standard, but also whether the
evidence on record could reasonably support those findings. 34 In
1990, Cage v. Louisiana marked the first time that the Supreme
Court overturned a reasonable doubt instruction as being
inadequate under the Winship standard.35 The Court was asked to
analyze the wording used in reasonable doubt jury instructions
under the Winship standard, which did not use Shaw’s classic
definition. Just a few years later in Sullivan v. Louisiana, the Court
held that reasonable doubt instructions that are deficient under the
Winship standard, like that in Cage, are not harmless error.36
In 1994, the Court combined two cases in Victor v. Nebraska
regarding instruction on reasonable doubt. 37 The instructions given
in both cases had their genesis based upon Shaw’s classic definition
delivered in Webster.38 The Court held that both instructions issued
were adequate and correctly instructed the jury on the concept of
reasonable doubt.39 The Court reasoned that it is not
which he is charged.
Id.
32. Robert C. Power, Reasonable and Other Doubts: The Problem of Jury
Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 45 (1999).
33. See Winship, 397 U.S. 358 at 364 (reasoning, “[t]o this end, the
reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact
the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’”).
34. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
35. See Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (reasoning “[I]t becomes clear
that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding
of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process
Clause.”).
36. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 (1993).
37. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994).
38. Id. at 8.
The instruction given in Sandoval's case has its genesis in a charge given
by Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
more than a century ago. The instruction given in Victor's case can be
traced to two separate lines of cases. Much of the charge is taken from
Chief Justice Shaw's Webster instruction.
Id.

39. See id. at 7.
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt;
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral
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constitutionally required to define reasonable doubt to the jury and
that it is a term that is not easily defined.40 However, the Court also
noted that the Constitution does not prohibit defining reasonable
doubt and Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence strongly advocated for
defining the term reasonable doubt to aid the jury.41 Justice
Ginsburg cited the Federal Judicial Center’s proposed definition for
reasonable doubt that she argued was straightforward and
accurate.42

evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of
the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge.
Id.
‘Reasonable doubt’ is such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and
prudent person, in one of the graver and more important transactions of
life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented facts as true and
relying and acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you, after
full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to have an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the guilt of the accused. At
the same time, absolute or mathematical certainty is not required. You
may be convinced of the truth of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and
yet be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. You may find an
accused guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided such
probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is
reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt
reasonably arising from the evidence, from the facts or circumstances
shown by the evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the
State, as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from
bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.
Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 27.
[T]he government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases,
where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more
likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government's proof must
be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of
the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we
know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not
require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your
consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on
the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty,
you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
Id.
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C. The State Court Dilemma: Whether to Define
Reasonable Doubt for the Jury
Currently, the state courts are split on the issue of whether to
define reasonable doubt. Illinois is in the minority of jurisdictions
that admonish trial courts from defining the term reasonable doubt,
even when asked by the jury for guidance. 43 Only 10 other states
find themselves in agreement with Illinois’ position. 44 As for the
remaining 39 states, they leave the decision to define the term up
to the trial court if there is no pattern jury instruction.45 The
Federal Courts are also split as to defining reasonable doubt. 46
Policy reasons behind the decision not to define the term is
grounded in the idea that it defies an easy explanation. 47 At least
one study suggests the language used to describe the rationale of
reasonable doubt may sway mock jurors to find that the reasonable
doubt standard was met, given the same case facts. 48 This seems to
support the idea that some of these courts’ reasoning in attempting
to define reasonable doubt is “the equivalent to playing with fire”
because any general definition will lend itself to favor one side more
than another in our adversarial system.49 Some believe that the
words themselves, provide the meaning needed for a jury.50

43. Timothy P. O'Neill, Instructing Illinois Juries on the Definition of
"Reasonable Doubt": The Need for Reform, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 921 (1996).
44. Id. (citing (1) Kentucky, (2) Mississippi, (3) Oklahoma, (4) Texas, (5)
Wyoming, (6) Oregon, (7) South Carolina, (8) Vermont, (9) Virginia and (10)
West Virginia, as states that do not define reasonable doubt to the jury).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 (reasoning “Although this standard is an ancient
and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication.”);
accord United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing “[T]his
court reasoned that defining reasonable doubt is often more confusing than
illuminating. An attempt to define reasonable doubt presents a risk without any
real benefit.”).
48. See Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An
Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139 (2016)
(finding “The conviction rate among jurors who were instructed to ‘search for
the truth’ was nearly double the conviction rate for jurors who were instructed
to evaluate the government's evidence for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
49. Casey Reynolds, Implicit Bias and the Problem of Certainty in the
Criminal Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 236 (2013) (citing
United States v. Shaffner, 524 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1975)).
50. See People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203, ¶ 1, 15 N.E. 3d 943
(citing People v. Moses, 288 Ill. 281 (1919) (reasoning “because there is no better
definition of the meaning of the words ‘reasonable doubt’ than the words
themselves.”).
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D. Recent Illinois Cases Suggest Reasonable Doubt Is
Not Understood by Juries
Several recent cases demonstrate that juries are questioning
the term reasonable doubt before making their decision in reaching
a verdict. In 2011, People v. Turman involved a jury asking the trial
court judge for a “more explicit, expansive definition of reasonable
doubt.”51 The trial court responded, “reasonable doubt is not defined
under Illinois law. It is for the jury to collectively determine what
reasonable doubt is.”52 On appeal, the trial court decision was
reversed and the court reasoned that the jury, if applying their own
standard, could unknowingly apply a standard lower than that of
reasonable doubt.53
Then in 2014, People v. Thomas called the same issue into
question when a jury sent a note to the judge asking, “What is the
legal definition of reasonable doubt?” 54 The judge replied, “It is for
you to determine.” 55 The appellate court upheld the trial court’s
statements to the jury holding, “[T]he trial court's instruction that
the meaning of ‘reasonable doubt’ is for jurors to determine is a[n]
[unquestionably] correct statement of Illinois law.” 56 Later that
same year, the trial court in People v. Downs similarly received a
letter asking, “What is your definition of reasonable doubt, 80%,
70%, 60%?”57 The court declined, “We cannot give you a definition it
is your duty to define.”58 On appeal, the court opined that the trial
court issued a deficient reasonable doubt instruction, resulting in
plain error.59 The Downs case made it all the way up to the Illinois
Supreme Court in 2015.60 The Court noted that while the lower
courts in Illinois should not define reasonable doubt, it is not per se
plain to do so.61 Unanimously, the Illinois Supreme Court explained
it historically prohibited judges and lawyers from defining
reasonable doubt because it is self-defining and therefore, does not
need a further definition.62 The Court stressed the point by
reiterating, since 1968 the Committee Note accompanying IPI
Criminal No. 2.05,63 has plainly provided that jurors should not
51. People v. Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019, ¶ 19, 954 N.E. 2d 845, 850.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 at ¶ 14.
55. Id.
56. Id. at ¶ 47
57. People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 17, 69 N.E. 3d 784, 788 reh’d denied
People v. Downs, No. 117934, 2015 Ill. LEXIS 779 (2015)
58. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 17
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at ¶ 19
63. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.05 (4th ed. 2000).
“The Committee recommends that no instruction be given defining the term
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receive a reasonable doubt definition. 64 Furthermore, the Court
clarified the trial court’s answer to the jury, “we cannot give you a
definition [of reasonable doubt]; it is your duty to decide,” did not
constitute a definition of reasonable doubt and was ‘unquestionably’
a correct statement of the law.”65

E. How Professionals Have Responded to Defining
Reasonable Doubt
Several recent cases illustrate the various responses to the
absence of a definition of reasonable doubt to the jury. In at least
three separate occasions, during voir dire a trial court judge used
his hands as scales to help illustrate the term reasonable doubt to
the jury, while telling the jury:
Somebody may have served on civil juries[.] [T]here the burden of
proof is a preponderance of the evidence and that's defined as more
likely than not that the event occurred. If you take a scale, all you
have to do is tip it, and that is what preponderance of the evidence is.
Illinois does not define reasonable doubt, but if you use the analogy
in a criminal case the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt,
if you use the analogy of the scale, it would be like this.66

In each of these cases, the appellate court found that the
statements by the trial courts did not constitute plain error. 67
However, in People v. Pledge, which was decided after Downs, the
court of appeals admonished the practice of the trial court
explaining, “While again we would prefer that the scale analogy not
be used, we trust this practice is no longer in use.” 68
In People v. Jenkins, the trial court judge was deemed to have
erroneously defined reasonable doubt to the jurors by using a
demonstration.69 There, the judge placed a rubber band around a
“reasonable doubt.” In People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill.2d 52, 61, 150 N.E.2d 806,
811 (1958), the Illinois Supreme Court stated: “Reasonable doubt is a term
which needs no elaboration and we have so frequently discussed the futility of
attempting to define it that we might expect the practice to be discontinued.
(People v. Schuele, 326 Ill. 366, 157 N.E. 215; People v. Rogers, 324 Ill. 224, 154
N.E. 909)); see also People v. Bowlby, 51 Ill. App. 2d 51, 201 N.E. 2d 136 (4th
Dist.1964).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. People v. Pledge, 2016 IL App (1st) 132200-U at ¶ 7; People v. Gill, 2014
IL App (1st) 123159-U at ¶ 3; People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (1st) 111317, ¶
52, 994 N.E. 2d 962, 971.
67. Id.
68. Pledge, 2016 IL App (1st) 132200 at ¶ 44.
69. See People v. Jenkins, 89 Ill. App. 3d 395, 396 (1st Dist. 1980).
By way of example, I'll use this glass of water. If you can see the glass
without this rubber band around it. That rubber band represents beyond
a reasonable doubt. The defendant is like a chip of wood in the bottom of
the glass. In order to prove the defendant guilty, the State must pour in
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glass of water and told them that the rubber band represented
reasonable doubt.70 He then explained metaphorically, the
defendant is like a chip of wood in the bottom of the glass and the
prosecution must pour in enough evidence, like water, to float the
defendant to the rubber band to prove his guilt. 71
In People v. Max, the court reviewed the statements made by
the prosecution in closing arguments. In closing arguments, the
prosecutor said “Now, beyond a reasonable doubt, there's—there's
no dictionary definition of that. I would suggest to you that if you
imagine a balance—”.72 At that point, the defense counsel objected,
and the trial court sustained the objection. 73 Later, during the
rebuttal portion of closing argument, the prosecutor spoke again
about reasonable doubt noting, “We all know better in our heart of
hearts exactly what went on here. And when you know inside your
heart of hearts, you know we have met our burden of proof of
proving Billie Max guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 74 After
reviewing the prosecution’s remarks in the totality of the
circumstances, the appellate court found no due process violation
occurred, citing Victor.75
Only a couple months before Downs, the Third District Court
of Appeals overturned a conviction due to the plain error of the
prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument. 76 In that case, the
prosecution told the jury in closing arguments, “Reasonableness,
ladies and gentlemen. That is our standard. Beyond a reasonable
doubt. It's not all doubt and it's not a hundred percent certainty. It's
beyond a reasonable doubt.”77 The court viewed the prosecution’s
enough water to float the defendant to the line of reasonable doubt,
represented by the rubber band. If they don't float the defendant that
high then they fail and you must find the defendant not guilty. If they
float the defendant to that line, then they have met their burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. And you must find her guilty. You must not
require the State to fill the glass. They don't have to prove it to a
mathematical certainty. But to a reasonable doubt. I hope the
illustration is helpful to you. It is a sometimes confusing concept. And I
want to be sure you understand it before we go on.
Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. People v. Max, 2012 IL App (3d) 110385, ¶ 40, 980 N.E. 2d 243, 253
73. Id.
74. Id. at ¶ 42.
75. Id. at ¶ 55 (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“Due process
is violated only if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood that the instructions allowed it to find the
defendant guilty based upon a standard of proof that was less than beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
76. People v. Cole, 2015 IL App (3d) 120992-U at ¶ 43.
77. See id. at ¶ 27.
Reasonableness, ladies and gentlemen. That is our standard. Beyond a
reasonable doubt. It's not all doubt and it's not a hundred percent
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comments as “an attempt to shift and diminish the burden of
proof.”78 There, it was the prosecutor who was trying to play on the
word “reasonable” and relate it to the standard of reasonable
doubt.79 In that sexual assault case, the prosecutor argued about
whether the defendant could have left any physical evidence from
the sexual assault because he had a vasectomy and the reviewing
court viewed this argument as burden shifting.80
Just a few months after Downs, the First District Court of
Appeals again found itself reviewing reasonable doubt when it was
asked to review the remarks made by the State during closing
arguments in People v. Thompson.81 In Thompson, the State
explained to the jury that it need not prove guilt beyond all doubt.
In addition, the State pointed out to the jury that traditionally
juries across the country find evidence in other cases sufficient to
meet the burden.82 In this case, the court pointed out the
prosecution’s comments were in rebuttal to the defense attorney’s
closing arguments, where the defense argued that the evidence did
not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.83 The
court cited Downs noting that for more than 100 years the Illinois
Supreme Court “has consistently held that the term reasonable
doubt should not be defined for the jury, that the term, in fact needs

certainty. It's beyond a reasonable doubt. Is it reasonable to think that
some other person who didn't have a vasectomy somehow got the rest of
his sperm to disappear? Isn't it more reasonable that the guy postvasectomy left one?
Id.

78. Id. at ¶ 28. “We consider that the State's comments constituted an
attempt to shift and diminish the burden of proof.” Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122265, ¶ 35, 37 N.E. 3d 931,
939. (holding the “prosecutor's comment during rebuttal argument regarding
reasonable doubt standard did not improperly minimize state's burden of proof;
[and] under plain error review, no prejudice resulted to defendant from
prosecutor's comment during rebuttal argument regarding reasonable doubt
standard.”).
82. See id. (explaining, “And with respect to reasonable doubt, that's a
burden that's met in courtrooms across the country every day. It's not proof
beyond all doubt, it's not prove any doubt [sic], it's proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. And you are the ones that determine what a reasonable doubt is.”).
83. See id.
[U]nder the plain error standard], we find no error. During her closing,
defense counsel mentioned “reasonable doubt” in several contexts.
During rebuttal, the State may respond to statements made by defense
counsel in closing argument that invite a response. We consider
comments in the proper context by examining the entire closing
argument of both sides. Our review of the record reveals that defense
counsel's argument invited the prosecutor's comments.
Id.

945

946

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:933

no definition because the words themselves sufficiently convey its
meaning.”84
The Supreme Court held that the lower courts are not required
to define reasonable doubt,85 the Illinois Supreme Court has
steadfastly held that Illinois courts should not define reasonable
doubt to juries.86 In addition, there are solid policy rationales for,
and against, defining the reasonable doubt standard to lay jurors as
made evident by the split among the states and federal
jurisdictions.87 The absence of a pattern jury instruction that
defines reasonable doubt,88 and the Illinois Supreme Court’s
prohibition of both judges and counsel from describing the
standard,89 has arguably led to juror confusion illustrated by recent
cases such as Turman, Thomas, and Downs.90

III. HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS CHANGED THE GAME: THE
PREVALENCE OF THE SMARTPHONE
Part III begins by analyzing whether the term “reasonable
doubt” is self-defining to a lay juror. It will discuss the belief some
jurors have that reasonable doubt is a legal term of art, and why it
is dangerous to leave a jury to self-define reasonable doubt. Finally,
it will explain the importance of “lifting the veil” from the jury’s eyes
so they have a better understanding of the highest burden required
by the law.

84. See People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 24, 69 N.E. 3d 784, 789 reh’g
denied People v. Downs, No. 117934, 2015 Ill LEXIS 779 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2015).
In decisions dating back more than 100 years, this court has consistently
held that the term ‘reasonable doubt’ should not be defined for the jury,
that the term, in fact, needs no definition because the words themselves
sufficiently convey its meaning. This restriction applies to both the trial
court and counsel.
Id.
85. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994).
86. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 24.
87. O’Neill, supra note 43.
88. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.05 (4th ed. 2000).
89. Raymond J. McKoski, The Ups And Downs Of Defining Reasonable
Doubt, THE CHI. BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD 32 (2015). “Neither judges nor
attorneys should attempt to define, explain, or illustrate the concept of
reasonable doubt in jury instructions, in voir dire, in answer to jury questions,
or during any other part of the trial.” Id.
90. Timothy P. O’Neill, Clearing The Fog Of “Reasonable Doubt” Important
For Due Process, CHI. DAILY LAW BULLETIN (Sept. 4, 2014), http://news.jmls.ed
u/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/16642-LB-reprint-JMLS-Sep04-2014-C-ONeill.p
df.
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A. Is Reasonable Doubt Self-Defining?
Some legal scholars believe reasonable doubt is self-defining.91
The self-defining concept is the idea that the words themselves
convey a sufficient meaning to the jurors, who will ultimately
employ its definition in a criminal trial. 92 This idea of self-defining
carries the belief that by separating the terms “reasonable” and
“doubt,” the jurors already know what these words mean separately
because they are already familiar with them from everyday usage. 93
And those same jurors can combine the words, and their individual,
“every day” meanings, to discern the concept of the legal standard
of reasonable doubt.94
This self-defining concept goes even further; the notion that
the words “reasonable doubt” cannot be adequately defined with a
standardized definition, and that any attempt to define the words,
would actually hinder or confuse a juror. 95 The confusion comes
from the inability to explain all the incidents of “reasonable doubt”
that the jury has encountered in their everyday life occurrences,
and any attempt to try to define that concept is more confusing than
insightful.96

91. See BARBARA E. BERGMAN, NANCY HOLLANDER & THERESA M. DUNCAN,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 2:4 (15th ed. 2015) (concluding “Most of
these courts have reached the conclusion that reasonable doubt need not be
defined on the grounds that the term is self-explanatory, and a definition would
tend only to confuse the jury.”); see also People v. Moses, 288 Ill. 281, 284 (1919)
(reasoning “because there is no better definition of the meaning of the words
‘reasonable doubt’ than the words themselves”).
92. People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 19, 69 N.E. 3d 784, 788 reh’g denied
People v. Downs, No. 117934, 2015 Ill LEXIS 779 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2015) (reasoning,
“The rationale behind this rule is that “reasonable doubt” is self-defining and
needs no further definition.”).
93. See United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir.1988) (reasoning,
“Reasonable doubt’ must speak for itself. Jurors know what is ‘reasonable’ and
are quite familiar with the meaning of ‘doubt.”).
94. See Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 24 (reasoning, “In decisions dating back
more than 100 years, this court has consistently held that the term ‘reasonable
doubt’ should not be defined for the jury, that the term, in fact, needs no
definition because the words themselves sufficiently convey its meaning.”).
95. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (reasoning, “Although this
standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it
defies easy explication.”); see also U.S. v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing, “In so ruling, this court reasoned that defining reasonable doubt
is often more confusing than illuminating.”).
96. See U.S. v. Witt, 648 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1981) (reasoning, “Courts
have recognized in recent years that the legal concept of the term is one of
common usage and acceptance.”); see also U.S. v. Bardin, 224 F.2d 255, 261 (7th
Cir. 1955) (citing, “The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a
mode of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence there can be yet
no successful method of communicating intelligibly to a jury a sound method of
self-analysis for one's belief.”).
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Some judges embrace this concept since any attempt at
defining could lead to a deficient definition in the law. 97 Also, the
inherent danger in defining the term would give one side of the
adversarial system an advantage, however slight, thus tipping the
scales of justice.98 Some of these scholars believe that there has yet
to be a single definition that entirely captures the true meaning of
reasonable doubt in words that would effectively convey its proper
meaning to the jury without possibly confusing the jury. 99 The selfdefining concept fosters the idea that the individual jurors must
deliberate as individuals and then collectively, as a jury, come to a
belief of what reasonable doubt means based on their own
individual experiences in life.100 This line of thought is arguably
how the Illinois Supreme Court held that a circuit court’s response,
“We cannot give you a definition [of reasonable doubt;] it is your
duty to define it” was a correct statement in the law.101
On the other hand, it has also been argued that lawyers and
judges only believe the concept of reasonable doubt is self-defining
simply because they themselves already have a good understanding
of the reasonable doubt standard.102 Some self –definer advocates
may have forgotten that it is because of their legal education that
97. See United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036,1038 (7th Cir. 1988) (reasoning,
“At best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury, and, at worst,
they have the potential to impair a defendant’s constitutional right to have the
government prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
98. Casey Reynolds, Implicit Bias and the Problem of Certainty in the
Criminal Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 236 (2013) (citing
United States v. Shaffner, 524 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1975).
99. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 31 (“The underlying premise in all of our
cases is that trying to explain things will confuse matters, and we cannot see
why a jury request should change this premise. If there is a definition that can
clarify the meaning of reasonable doubt, common sense suggests that such a
definition be offered to all juries, even those that do not venture a request. But
until we find a definition that so captures the meaning of ‘reasonable doubt’
that we would mandate its use in all criminal trials in this circuit, we cannot
hold that it is error to refuse to give some definition.”) (citing United States v.
Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 46 (4th Cir.1994)).
100. People v. Franklin, 2012 IL App (3d) 100618, ¶ 4, 970 N.E. 2d 1247,
1249 (“Beyond a reasonable doubt means beyond a reasonable doubt. It's what
each of you individually and collectively, as 12 of you, believe is beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
101. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶ 23.
102. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 25 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
While judges and lawyers are familiar with the reasonable doubt
standard, the words ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ are not self-defining for
jurors. Several studies of jury behavior have concluded that ‘jurors are
often confused about the meaning of reasonable doub’ t when that term
is left undefined. Thus, even if definitions of reasonable doubt are
necessarily imperfect, the alternative—refusing to define the concept at
all—is not obviously preferable.
Id.
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has made them aware of how these words fit together to formulate
legal terminology. However, some jurors are without this legal
education, and they may not have the ability to ascertain a legal
concept of “reasonable” and “doubt.” just because they may be
familiar with these words in today’s lexicon. 103
Opponents of the self-defining concept argue even judges do
not always agree that their peers correctly advised the jury of the
reasonable doubt standard.104 If judges cannot always come to a full
consensus of the meaning of reasonable doubt, it is illogical to
believe lay jurors who may have absolutely no legal education or
very little education at all could comprehend the concept. 105
Furthermore, juries of vastly different ages, livelihoods, and
experiences have a different view of reasonable doubt from not only
each other, but especially from legal scholars.106 Simply put, the
legal field must remember that juries are often made up of lay
people who lack complex knowledge of legal concepts, legal
standards, and importantly, the policies behind all of those concepts
and standards.107 Many of these jurors are, by profession, outside
the legal community and rarely actually ever serve on juries. 108
103. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 25.
Although, as a district judge, I dutifully repeated [the ‘hesitate to act’
standard] to juries in scores of criminal trials, I was always bemused by
its ambiguity. If the jurors encounter a doubt that would cause them to
‘hesitate to act in a matter of importance,’ what are they to do then?
Should they decline to convict because they have reached a point of
hesitation, or should they simply hesitate, then ask themselves whether,
in their own private matters, they would resolve the doubt in favor of
action, and, if so, continue on to convict?
Id.

104. People v. Pledge, 2016 IL App (1st) 132200-U at ¶ 7; People v. Gill, 2014
IL App (1st) 123159-U at ¶ 3; People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (1st) 111317, ¶
52, 994 N.E. 2d 962, 971.
105. Reynolds, supra note 98, at 236.
106. See People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 304 (1915).
The defendant in a criminal case is entitled to be tried by a jury of 12
drawn from the voters of the county, and under our system of drawing
juries the jurors are generally of widely different ages, occupations,
experience, and ability. They must all agree on a verdict. What would
amount to a reasonable doubt or be defined as a reasonable doubt by one
juror would not necessarily be so considered by another, and yet the
defendant is entitled, under the law, to have just such a jury pass on his
case, is entitled to the verdict of each member of the jury, and has the
right to have each one resolve in his own mind whether or not, from all
the evidence, he has what he deems to be a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt.
Id.
107. Id.
108. Susan Saulny, Jury Duty? Prepare for Rejection; Though Many Are
Called, Few Ever Deliberate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2003), www.nytimes.com/200
3/09/08/nyregion/jury-duty-prepare-for-rejection-though-many-are-called-few-e

949

950

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:933

Given this unfamiliarity, with the legal system and its concepts like
reasonable doubt, and the unfamiliarity with actually serving as a
juror, it is likely that some jurors would find it confusing not to be
supplied with a definition for reasonable doubt. 109
It is only fair to say jurors are often unfamiliar with process of
being a juror, and they are looking to the professionals in this arena
(the judges and attorneys) for guidance because this is not their
chosen profession. However, when these juries look to the legal
professionals for guidance, these teachers, construction workers,
and business professionals, are instructed, “We cannot give you a
definition [of reasonable doubt;] it is your duty to define [it].” 110

B. Recent Cases of Jury Misconduct Suggest
Reasonable Doubt Is Not Self-Defining
Within the last decade, there have been some cases of jury
misconduct that suggest reasonable doubt is not self-defining to
jurors.111 These cases reveal that the internet and smartphone
communications are new temptations for jurors, especially jurors
who want a clear-cut answer as to what reasonable doubt means. 112
In one example, a juror used his cellular phone to call his own
attorney and ask his attorney to explain the definition of reasonable
doubt to him.113 Another case revealed that at least two jurors
Googled the definition of reasonable doubt to find its meaning. 114 In
that case, at least one of the two jurors who researched the
definition of reasonable doubt shared the definition with the rest of

ver-deliberate.html.
109. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 26 (1994) (citing studies, “Several
studies of jury behavior have concluded that ‘jurors are often confused about
the meaning of reasonable doubt’ when that term is left undefined.”).
110. See People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 24, 69 N.E. 3d 784, 788 reh’g
denied People v. Downs, No. 117934, 2015 Ill LEXIS 779 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2015).
We believe that Thomas reached the correct conclusion on this point, and
hold that here, the circuit court’s response to the jury— ‘We cannot give
you a definition [of reasonable doubt;] it is your duty to define [it]’ —was
unquestionably correct. There was no error in this response. In decisions
dating back more than 100 years, this court has consistently held that
the term ‘reasonable doubt’ should not be defined for the jury, that the
term, in fact, needs no definition because the words themselves
sufficiently convey its meaning.
Id.

111. See infra notes, 112, 114, 117, 119.
112. Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Juror Looks Up Word and Finds
Trouble, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2006), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conten
t/article/2006/04/28/AR2006042800845.html.
113. Id.
114. Juror Google Research Results In Granting Motion For A New Trial,
FED. EVIDENCE REVIEW (Oct. 1, 2013), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2013/se
ptember/juror-google-research-results-new-trial.
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the jury so that the juror could “be more comfortable with her
decision.”115 This research caused a new trial to be ordered in that
case because “the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice
resulting from the jury’s exposure to extraneous information could
not be rebutted.”116 In another case, a juror looked up reasonable
doubt, among other legal terms, and printed them out. 117 The juror
then brought those pages defining the terms to the other jurors to
aid their deliberations.118 Yet in another case, a juror used the
internet to research the statute for the pending charge and then he
clicked a link for the crime’s penalty. 119 Importantly, in this case the
juror revealed his motives to conduct the research. 120 He divulged
that turning to Google for information was second nature for some
people.121 This is particularly enlightening because it provides
further evidence that some people have found it routine to “Google
it when you don’t know it.”122 At least one news reporter asserts that
nationally, jurors have been internet researching or Googling, a
wide range of terms including reasonable doubt. 123
These examples illustrate why it is dangerous to allow a
confused jury to self-define reasonable doubt themselves. It is
particularly problematic because some jurors do not think it is a
violation to pick up their smartphones and Google the term
reasonable doubt, as demonstrated in these cases. 124 Many
professionals have acknowledged that this type of behaviors is

115. Id.
116. Id. (citing United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 2016) (“A
new trial was later granted due to juror misconduct.”)).
117. Mary Pat Gallagher, Juror Is Spared Sanctions For Doing Internet
Research In Sex-Crime Trial, N.J. LAW JOURNAL (2011), www.ediscoverylawal
ert.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/243/2012/02/Link-1A.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Ken Armstrong, Case Of The Curious Juror: When The Web Invades
The Courtroom, THE SEATTLE TIMES, www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crim
e/case-of-the-curious-juror-when-the-web-invades-the-courtroom/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2015 at 3:24 PM CDT ).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. I don’t know, Google it., FACEBOOK (Feb. 7, 2017, 11:06 PM CDT),
www.facebook.com/I-dont-know-google-it-333798880092
123. Armstrong, supra note 119.
124. See David E. Aaronson & Sydney M. Patterson, Modernizing Jury
Instructions In The Age Of Social Media, 27 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2013).
Despite instructions from the judge not to conduct research on the case,
a juror in a murder trial looked up definitions online for the terms ‘livor
mortis’ and ‘;algor mortis’ and the role it might have had in fixing the
time of a beating victim's death. When asked about it, the juror
responded, ‘To me that wasn't research. It was a definition.; The Court
of Special Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial,
finding that the juror's online search was in direct violation of the trial
court judge's order prohibiting jurors from researching the case.
Id.
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almost second-nature today. For example, a judge in Washington
suggested that when it comes to researching terms on the internet,
“[i]t’s almost reflexive. We want to know something, and we go on
the internet.”125 But this is no excuse; instead it is evidence that the
absence of a definition for reasonable doubt can be more harmful
than it is helpful.
Advancements in technology have added another dimension to
the problem of allowing jurors to self-define reasonable doubt.126 In
today’s society almost everyone, including the potential juror,
carries an internet-enabled smartphone with them everywhere they
go.127 Studies suggest that some people feel that these Googlesearch-capable-devices are just “an extension of [them]selves.” 128 In
2015, it was found that nearly two out of three people own a
smartphone of some kind.129
The emergence of the smartphone in the last decade has made
it easier for jurors to conduct a Google search for “reasonable doubt”
that gives them 7,030,000 results in 0.61 seconds.130 It is but a few
more seconds to access several websites that will give them a
variety of explanations and definitions for reasonable doubt. The
effect of leaving jurors to their own devices may lead to reasonable
doubt being defined by any number of different sources, including
the publicly edited Wikipedia. 131

125. Armstrong, supra note 119.
126. Juror Google Research Results In Granting Motion For A New Trial,
FED. EVIDENCE REVIEW (Oct. 1, 2013), www.federalevidence.com/blog/2013/
september/juror-google-research-results-new-trial.
(“With
increasing
frequency, courts have noted concerns over juror research during a jury trial
including over the Internet.”)
127. Armstrong, supra note 119. (“These days just about everyone carries a
smartphone. So judges beseech jurors to keep those phones in their pockets, or
at least to avoid the search engine: No Googling the defendant or the attorneys
or the law or the meaning of words or anything else related to the case.”).
128. Russell B. Clayton, Glenn Lesner, & Anthony Almond, The Extended
iSelf: The Impact of iPhone Separation on Cognition, Emotion, and Physiology,
JOURNAL OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION, (Jan. 8, 2015), http://onli
nelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcc4.12109/full.
129. Arron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Apr. 1, 2015), www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.
130. “Reasonable Doubt”, GOOGLE, www.google.com/search?q=reasonable+d
oubt&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8. (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
131. Wikipedia: Introduction, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wik
ipedia:Introduction (last visited Feb. 7, 2017 at 4:00 PM CDT).
Wikipedia is a free encyclopedia, written collaboratively by the people
who use it. It is a special type of website designed to make collaboration
easy, called a wiki. Many people are constantly improving Wikipedia,
making thousands of changes per hour. All of these changes are recorded
in article histories and recent changes. For a more detailed account of
the project, see About Wikipedia.
Id.
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The danger is some jurors are potentially evaluating the
evidence against a standard that has been defined to them from
some unreliable website source, and the damage cannot be undone
if there is no way for the court to know.132 Indeed, one author
proposes that criminalization is an alternative solution to address
this type of juror misconduct since jury instructions are not capable
of preventing jurors from turning to the Internet.133

C. Contemplating Change in Stare Decisis When
Society Changes Because of Technology
The doctrine of stare decisis allows the courts to remain
consistent and hold in a “principled and intelligible fashion;” but the
courts will deviate if there are reasons that demonstrate new facts
that support the change.134 The recent advancements in technology
and more importantly, the examples of juror misconduct using new
technology, suggest reasons for reviewing the 100-year precedent of
not supplying the jury with some information about reasonable
doubt.
However, any change bears real consequences and instructing
the jury that “‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or different meaning

132. Armstrong, supra note 119. (“For judges and lawyers, independent
research by jurors poses danger. Information gleaned from the Internet or other
sources can be misleading, false, incomplete, irrelevant, unfair or outdated.
Bogus material might even be planted. The possibilities seem as endless as the
Web. And if the lawyers don’t know what information a jury is relying upon,
they have no opportunity to rebut or clarify.”).
133. Matthew Aglialoro, Criminalization of Juror Misconduct Arising From
Social Media Use, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y (2014).
[T]his Essay set out to consider criminalization as an alternative solution
to juror misconduct arising from social media use. Jury instructions
alone have been far from effective, as is evident from the various ways
in which social media has led to misconduct. The unique nature of social
media indicates that jury instructions are ill-suited to prevent jurors
from using websites such as Facebook or Twitter throughout trial.
Id.
134. See Chicago B. Ass'n v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502,
510 (1994).
The doctrine of stare decisis is the means by which courts ensure that
the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a
principled and intelligible fashion. Stare decisis permits society to
presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals. The doctrine thereby contributes
to the integrity of our constitutional system of government both in
appearance and in fact. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command.
However, a court will detour from the straight path of stare decisis only
for articulable reasons, and only when the court must bring its decisions
into agreement with experience and newly ascertained facts.
Id.
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in law than it has when used in any of the ordinary transactions or
affairs of life” is no different. Even though it can be argued that
this statement is simplistic and straight forward, it still comes with
the dangers that the self-definers caution.
First, telling a jury composed of people from all types of
backgrounds ranging from the freshman in college to the retired 30year veteran police officer, that their own life experiences of
reasonable doubt are what they should use to shape their definition
of reasonable doubt could be troubling for some. Those jury
members would have different life experiences, and that would
leave them with a difference in perception of reasonable doubt that
they each have encountered.135
On the other hand, this variance in life experience is arguably
what fosters a healthy debate in the deliberation room. 136 One study
demonstrated deliberations among the jury reduced individual
biases and increased the probability that the jury would follow the
judge’s instructions. 137 One judge reasoned that the refusal to give
jurors a definition of reasonable doubt requires them to “wrestle
with the term’s meaning themselves.” 138 So then, facilitating a
discussion about the juror’s life experiences with reasonable doubt
by instructing them that it has the same definition in the law as it
does in ordinary life follows the self-defining concept.

135. See People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 304 (1915).
The defendant in a criminal case is entitled to be tried by a jury of 12
drawn from the voters of the county, and under our system of drawing
juries the jurors are generally of widely different ages, occupations,
experience, and ability. They must all agree on a verdict. What would
amount to a reasonable doubt or be defined as a reasonable doubt by one
juror would not necessarily be so considered by another, and yet the
defendant is entitled, under the law, to have just such a jury pass on his
case, is entitled to the verdict of each member of the jury, and has the
right to have each one resolve in his own mind whether or not, from all
the evidence, he has what he deems to be a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt.
Id.

136. JURY ETHICS 6 (John Kleining & James P. Levine eds., 2006) (“The
purpose of jury decision-making is not democratic majoritarianism, but
consensus or at least concurrence achieved after a situation has been
scrutinized from a suitably diverse set of perspectives.”).
137. Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt? An
Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139 (2016)
(“Some studies show that “deliberations sometimes do influence outcomes,”
including, for example, a study in which juror deliberations reduced individual
juror biases and made them more likely to follow the judge's instructions.”).
138. People v. Thomas, 15 N.E.3d 943, 949 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“As a
practical matter, the refusal to supply a definition requires jurors to wrestle
with the term’s meaning themselves. This is no bad thing: the American legal
system is premised on the belief that jurors represent the conscience of the
community and will act diligently and thoughtfully in applying the law.”).
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Secondly, it is also argued that “reasonable doubt” is comprised
of words used in the everyday lexicon of the juror. 139 Therefore,
some courts believe there is no need to instruct the jury on
reasonable doubt even if they request guidance from the court. 140
Some courts believe this because the best-case scenario at any
attempt to define will be unhelpful and are potentially deficient in
the law.141
However, since there are documented incidents where the jury
asked the court specifically for a definition, it is difficult to argue
that the words “reasonable doubt” successfully convey their
meaning to the jury. This notion provides some with cognitive
dissonance as the two ideas conflict on their very premise. The
words do not convey the meaning of “reasonable doubt” otherwise
the jury would not ask for a definition.142 Jury instructions often
provide definitions for many words that are commonly used among
the public such as “reasonable belief,” 143 “actual knowledge,”144
“unborn child,”145 “cohabit,”146 and even “prostitute,”147 which can
139. See United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir.1988) (reasoning
“Reasonable doubt’ must speak for itself. Jurors know what is ‘reasonable’ and
are quite familiar with the meaning of ‘doubt.”).
140. See id. (reasoning “[R]easonable doubt should not be defined even with
request from jury.”).
141. See United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1038 (7th Cir. 1988)
(reasoning, “At best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury, and,
at worst, they have the potential to impair a defendant’s constitutional right to
have the government prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
142. Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving
Meaning To A Critical Concept, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 677 (1995).
Likewise, a set of studies in Florida found that potential veniremen were
confused about what was required by the reasonable doubt and
presumption of innocence standards. Anecdotal evidence appears to
corroborate the results of these studies. In one instance, a Colorado juror
went home and consulted a dictionary for the meaning of reasonable
doubt. She shared her new knowledge with another juror before both
decided that the defendant was not guilty.
Id.

143. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.13 (4th ed. 2000).
“The phrases “reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” mean that the person
concerned, acting as a reasonable person, believes that the described facts
exist.” Id.
144. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01C (4th ed. 2000).
“Actual knowledge is direct and clear knowledge, that is, knowledge of such
information as would lead a reasonable person to inquire further.” Id.
145. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7.24 (4th ed. 2000).
“The term ‘unborn child’ means any individual of the human species from
fertilization until birth.”
146. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 9.05A (4th ed. 2000).
"The word ‘cohabit’ means the living together of a man and woman in the same
manner as if they were married to one another.” Id.
147. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 9.21 (4th ed. 2000).
“The word ‘prostitute’ means a person who [ (performs) (offers to perform)
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arguably be said to be a part of the lay vocabulary because they are
in many television shows, movies, and books. 148 Therefore, if the
argument is that the jury is already familiar with what reasonable
doubt means, then many of these jury instructions may be
eliminated if the jury is also familiar with those words. 149
Notably, Illinois has jury instructions defining the burdens for
proof for meeting the preponderance of the evidence, 150 and clear
and convincing evidence.151 By providing definitions for these lower
standards establishes a persuasive argument to provide at least
some guidance for reasonable doubt to an inquiring jury. Be that
as it may, those that argue for self-defining assert that the risk
outweighs any benefit to attempt to define reasonable doubt
because any definition runs the risk of being legally deficient. 152
This risk is true of any definition or explanation that is provided to
the jury based on the Winship standard that “so long as taken as a
whole, the instructions correctly convey the concept of reasonable
doubt.”153

(agrees to perform) ] [ (an act of sexual penetration) (any touching or fondling
of the sex organs of a person by another person for the purpose of sexual arousal
or gratification) ] for any money, property, token, object, or article or anything
of value.” Id.
148. Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving
Meaning to A Critical Concept, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 677 (1995) stating:
Some have argued that because this important phrase is made up of
words commonly used by lay people, it does not need to be defined. But
jury instructions frequently define far simpler words and phrases that
are part of the lay vocabulary, such as ‘attempt,’ ‘knowingly,’ ’possession,'
and ‘agreement.’ Model instructions also routinely define ‘conspiracy’
and ’circumstantial evidence’ -- terms that, like reasonable doubt, have
become part of the lay language through television programs, movies,
and books. Indeed, if the test is whether terms are used by lay people,
then many jury instructions could be eliminated.
Id.

149. Id.
150. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.18 (4th ed. 2000).
“Definition of Preponderance Of The Evidence, The phrase ‘preponderance of
the evidence’ means whether, considering all the evidence in the case, the
proposition on which the defendant has the burden of proof is more probably
true than not true.” Id.
151. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.19 (4th ed. 2000).
“The phrase ‘clear and convincing evidence’ means that degree of proof which,
considering all the evidence in the case, produces the firm and abiding belief
that it is highly probable that the proposition on which the defendant has the
burden of proof is true.” Id.
152. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 275 (1993) (holding “that
constitutionally deficient reasonable doubt instruction required reversal of
conviction.”).
153. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 2 (1994) (holding “The Constitution
does not dictate that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury
of the government’s burden of proof, so long as “taken as a whole, the
instructions correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt.”).
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The United States Supreme Court has found in two cases, Cage
and Sullivan, the definition supplied to the jury fell below the
Winship standard. In both of those cases the court noted that the
instructions were nearly identical.154 Importantly, the Court noted
that the words “grave uncertainty,” “moral certainty,” and “actual
substantial doubt,” were problematic since the juror could have
found guilt without the required proof.155 Conversely, telling the
jury simply that “[t]he term ‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or
different meaning in law than it has when used in any of the
ordinary transactions or affairs of life[]” does not create the
problems associated with Cage and Sullivan.
While some may believe that reasonable doubt is self-defining,
it is documented that some jurors have not found it easily
understood. Although these cases demonstrating the jurors’
confusion about the issue of reasonable doubt are not daily
occurrences, they nonetheless demonstrate that the term is not
always easily understood. Further, these demonstrations of juror
confusion, coupled with the increasing opportunity to use modern
technology to conduct research, could create a perfect storm of juror
misconduct that leads to misapplication of the reasonable doubt
standard.

IV. LIFTING THE VEIL FOR THE CONFUSED JUROR
Many recent cases such as Downs have demonstrated that
juries often wonder what exactly reasonable doubt means, and will
go to many lengths to get a clear-cut definition. As a result, it is
apparent that the court needs to guide the jury and answer their
questions regarding this legal term of art. If the courts do not aid
154. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 (1993) (reasoning “In his
instructions to the jury, the trial judge gave a definition of “reasonable doubt”
that was, as the State conceded below, essentially identical to the one held
unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d
339 (1990).”).
155. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
The charge did at one point instruct that to convict, guilt must be found
beyond a reasonable doubt; but it then equated a reasonable doubt with
a ‘grave uncertainty’ and an ‘actual substantial doubt,’ and stated that
what was required was a ‘moral certainty’ that the defendant was guilty.
It is plain to us that the words ‘substantial’ and ‘grave,’ as they are
commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required
for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt standard. When those
statements are then considered with the reference to ‘moral certainty,’
rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable
juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt
based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process
Clause.
Id.
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juries when they make such a request, the courts run the risk of
having Google do it for them via a few seconds in the bathroom stall
on a cellphone. The fact is, jurors get breaks; they get to call their
families and sometimes they can go home before a verdict is
reached. While many courts in Illinois prohibit people from
entering the court building with their smartphones, this restriction
“does not apply to persons reporting for jury service.” 156 If you tell
the jury that it must define reasonable doubt itself, then the jurors
will use their resources to learn how to apply this legal standard in
a few seconds on their smartphone.157
Due to emergence of smartphone technology, the ability for
jurors to consult the internet has made it obvious that courts should
assure the jurors that they already know the answer to the
definition of reasonable doubt.158 It is the premise of the selfdefining argument that courts should not define reasonable doubt
because as Judge Cooke noted in one of his opinions as early as
1912, “[t]he term ‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or different
meaning in law than it has when used in any of the ordinary
transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether any better
definition of the term can be found than the words themselves.” 159
156. State of Illinois, Circuit Court of Cook County, Frequently Asked
Questions, General Questions, What Can I Bring with Me To Jury Service?,
COOK COUNTY COURT, www.cookcountycourt.org/FORJURORS/FrequentlyAsk
edQuestions.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2017 at 5:15 PM CDT).
I have heard there is a courthouse ban on electronic devices such as
cellphones and laptops. Does this apply to jurors? The courthouse ban on
cellphones and electronic devices was enacted to protect the privacy and
safety of persons attending court and to maintain court decorum. It does
not apply to persons reporting for jury service. You may bring such
devices with you when you report for jury service and use them while
you are in the jury assembly room. However, they must be turned off
when you are in a courtroom. The trial judge will inform you whether
you may use such devices to take notes during the trial.
Id. (emphasis in original).
157. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01A (4th ed. 2000).
Preliminary Cautionary Instructions Before opening Statements[,] [2]
You should not do any independent investigation or research on any
subject or person relating to the case. . . . [3] For example, you must not
use the Internet or any other sources to search for any information about
the case, or the law which applies to the case.
Id.

158. See People v. Barkas, 99 N.E. 698, 702-703, (1912) (reasoning “The term
‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or different meaning in law than it has when
used in any of the ordinary transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether
any better definition of the term can be found than the words themselves.”).
159. See People v. Downs, No.117934, 2015 WL 3791445, *4 (Ill. June 18,
2015) (reasoning “The rationale behind this rule is that “reasonable doubt” is
self-defining and needs no further definition.”) (citing People v. Barkas, 99 N.E.
at 702-703 (1912) (reasoning “The term ‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or
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The Illinois Supreme Court cited to this case and its exact
premise that juries already know what the definition is for
reasonable doubt.160 So, the reason that jurors are looking for the
definition is because they are given the definition for many other
words and legal concepts during the course of the trial, but when
they look for reasonable doubt, they come up empty handed. 161 The
jurors think that the court is hiding something from them, and
when they inquire as to a definition, they are told that they must
define it themselves.162 This is what causes a desire to look to the
“extension of themselves” in their smartphone and Google, to give
them something that they can use.
The court can “lift the veil,” from the jury’s eyes by telling them
that the definition of reasonable doubt is what they have
determined by their own life experiences. 163 Telling the jury that
they already know what the definition is based on their life
experiences helps quell the need, and desire, to look elsewhere for a
“definition” because it is not some elusive concept that “they must
define.”164 This simple idea that Justice Cooke noted back in 1912
may help, at the least, when the jury requests a definition because
it gives them guidance to look at their own life experiences to help
them understand the critical concept of the highest burden in our
court system.165 Juries are placed in a predicament that they hold a
man’s fate before them and they do not want to get it wrong. 166 So,
different meaning in law than it has when used in any of the ordinary
transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether any better definition of the
term can be found than the words themselves.”)).
160. Id.
161. See Downs, No.117934, 2015 WL 3791445, at *4 (Ill. June 18, 2015)
(explaining “Consistent with this case law is Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal, No. 2.05 (4th ed. 2000). Though it is titled, “Definition Of Reasonable
Doubt,” it provides no definition. Instead, it provides a Committee Note stating:
“The Committee recommends that no instruction be given defining the term
‘reasonable doubt.’” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.05 (4th
ed. 2000). This court’s established precedent and the directive set forth in
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2 support the conclusion that
the circuit court’s response to the jury, “We cannot give you a definition [;] it is
your duty to define,” taken by itself, did not violate the admonition against
defining the term.” Id.
162. See Downs, No.117934, 2015 WL 3791445, at *1 (Ill. June 18, 2015).
(holding the court’s response of “We cannot give you a definition [of reasonable
doubt] it is your duty to define” to jury question asking for definition of
“reasonable doubt” did not violate the admonition against defining the term).
163. See Barkas, 99 N.E. at 702-703 (reasoning “The term ‘reasonable doubt’
has no other or different meaning in law than it has when used in any of the
ordinary transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether any better
definition of the term can be found than the words themselves.”).
164.See Downs, No.117934, 2015 WL 3791445, at *1 (Ill. June 18, 2015).
(holding that court’s response of “We cannot give you a definition [of reasonable
doubt] it is your duty to define” to jury question asking for definition of
“reasonable doubt” did not violate the admonition against defining the term).
165. In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970).
166. People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203, ¶ 25, 15 N.E.3d 943, 949
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when they are confused, especially confused enough to ask the judge
for assistance, the court should help them167 or risk losing them to
Google, and the search engine doing it for them instead.
The court should formally instruct the jury with an Illinois
pattern jury instruction that states that “Reasonable Doubt is not
defined under Illinois Law because the term ‘reasonable doubt’ has
no other or different meaning in law than it has when used in any
of the ordinary transactions or affairs of life.”168
The reason for this instruction is straightforward and simple.
First, it is not a confusing or bloated definition that attempts to
define people’s life experiences in words. Secondly, the notion that
the jury already knows the meaning of reasonable doubt is a
bedrock in the over 100-year precedent of the Illinois Supreme
Court.169 Importantly, this instruction tells the jury that no
definition is needed for reasonable doubt because they already know
it by their own life experiences. Therefore, the jury will not be
tempted to look elsewhere for a definition of a legal term of art that
they are not sure what it means. This also gives the jury comfort in
dispelling any preconceived notions that they do not know what
reasonable doubt means. This may reduce the desire to look up
what they already know, and lead them to a foundation from which
to begin their deliberations. Each juror can speak to the reasonable
doubt that they have experienced in their own life and whether the
government has met its burden of proving every element beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In the alternative, the courts should at least give this definition
to a jury who requests a definition of reasonable doubt. When the
jury requests assistance, they are demonstrating confusion, and
therefore the court has a duty to aid the jury by attempting to clarify
the instructions for the jury.170 Providing this one sentence
(reasoning, “[T]he American legal system is premised on the belief that jurors
represent the conscience of the community and will act diligently and
thoughtfully in applying the law.”).
167. See Hunter v. Smallwood, 328 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)
(reasoning “Even where a situation is relatively clear to a trial court, in most
cases it would probably be more consistent with the ends of justice if the trial
court makes an attempt to clarify the instructions for the jury . . . or at least
attempting to understand the problem which is confusing the jurors.”).
168. See Barkas, 99 N.E. at 702-703 (reasoning “The term ‘reasonable doubt’
has no other or different meaning in law than it has when used in any of the
ordinary transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether any better
definition of the term can be found than the words themselves.”).
169. See Downs, 2015 IL 117934 at ¶24 (reasoning “In decisions dating back
more than 100 years, this court has consistently held that the term ‘reasonable
doubt’ should not be defined for the jury, that the term, in fact, needs no
definition because the words themselves sufficiently convey its meaning.”).
170. See Hunter, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 391.
Even where a situation is relatively clear to a trial court, in most cases
it would probably be more consistent with the ends of justice if the trial
court makes an attempt to clarify the instructions for the jury… or at
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instruction may still be frustrating to an already confused jury;
however, it is arguably better than telling them that they must
define it without the context that they already know it.
This instruction would likely have eliminated the issue created
in Downs completely since the jury would have been instructed
beforehand that there is no other meaning in the law than in
everyday life. This may have led the jury away from the
mathematical percentages mindset they came to in the note to the
court.
However, if the court used the proposed instruction after the
jury note was sent requesting clarification, then it may be a bit more
complicated. In Downs, the jury used percentages to define their
mathematical level of doubt that was reasonable. The jury used
60%, 70%, or 80% in their note to the court and this provides a
context that the jury was not thinking about reasonable doubt in
terms of life experiences, but to a degree of mathematical certainty.
In this case, the proposed instruction may have helped realign the
jury’s deliberations away from mathematical percentages and back
to the reasonable doubt that they have experienced in their own life.
In the cases preceding Downs, such as Turman, Franklin, and
Thomas, the jury sent notes to the court asking for a definition for
reasonable doubt. These cases represent that the jury may be
confused when there is a lack of any type of instruction on
reasonable doubt. The proposed instruction could aid the jury in
these cases by providing the jury the understanding that the
reasonable doubt standard is something that they are already
familiar with from their own life experiences. It is not clear whether
this proposed instruction would eliminate the juror confusion in
these cases; however, at the very least, such instruction would
provide the premise and the context for the court when it is forced
to tell the jurors that it is up to them to decide the definition of
reasonable doubt.
While the opinion in Downs clearly shows the reluctance of the
Illinois Supreme Court to allow for any formal Illinois Pattern Jury
Instruction like the one Justice Ginsburg cited in her concurrence
in Victor, it is also clear that juries have and will continue to be
confused by the term reasonable doubt. Technology advancements,
particularly in the smartphone arena, have made it too easy for a
confused juror to be tempted to reach out to Google when the court’s
hands are tied.
Illinois should step out from the shadows of the self-defining
mentality to at least acknowledge the real dangers posed by
technology and the emergence of the Google-enabled smartphone.

least attempting to understand the problem which is confusing the
jurors.
Id.
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Many in society see this smartphone as just an extension of
themselves, and therefore, it is not really researching to Google it.
Even more, the reasonable doubt standard is only used for
criminal trials, in which a lot is at stake for the accused. These trials
enable the government to take away an individual’s liberty. and
these criminal trials allow the government to impose the highest
power that it has, to take away one’s liberty. Accordingly, it is dire
to look at this issue critically and stare decisis requires that the law
change for good reasons, for instance, the emergence of
technological changes in society. With increased technology, the
court must reexamine the 100-year holding that the words
“reasonable doubt” define themselves. There are many things that
have changed in the past 100 years, and some for good reason. Here,
the court needs to reject the notion that people are exposed to the
same things that they were 100 years; and more importantly, it
must acknowledge the fact that it is far easier for the modern juror
to gain access to a broad spectrum of information both quickly and
easily through modern technology that may cause a mistrial. 171
Society today has become ever reliant on technology and it has led
to many other problems like the need for instant gratification and
increase in communicating via a device instead of human
interaction. Things that would encourage deliberations would be
helpful for juries. There is nothing better than allowing people to
talk about their own life experiences of reasonable doubt to help
each other understand the concept. However, it is crucial to give
proper context to the conversation by establishing a baseline; that
they already know what reasonable doubt really means. That way,
hopefully, no one is using their smartphone to search Google allow
reasonable doubt to be defined by whatever is found at the top of
the results.

IV. CONCLUSION
The law forbidding Illinois courts from instructing the jury on
reasonable doubt is in need of review and revision. The court should
create an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction that eliminates the
confusion about the definition of reasonable doubt. This instruction
should be given at every criminal trial and in the alternative at least

171. Armstrong, supra note 119. William Downing, a King County judge
who co-chairs the committee, stated:
In the not-so-distant past, the biggest concerns were that a juror might
go to a law library to look up legal information, might go to the public
library to peruse old newspaper stories about a crime or might go to the
scene of an auto accident to check out sightlines. Those steps took work.
Now they can just ‘pull out a smartphone or tablet.
Id.
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when the jury requests aid from the court. The court’s instruction
should be the simple sentence that Justice Cooke coined over 105
years ago that “Reasonable Doubt is not defined under Illinois Law
because the term ‘reasonable doubt’ has no other or different
meaning in law than it has when used in any of the ordinary
transactions or affairs of life.”172
This simple instruction could potentially eliminate numerous
cases of juror misconduct and would no longer tie the hands of the
court when asked for assistance from the jury. Furthermore, the
term reasonable doubt will no longer be viewed by jurors as a legal
term of art, but instead it will be something they can personally
relate to by their own life experiences. Finally, this instruction is
not likely deficient in the law as it does not provide the jury with a
“reasonable likelihood that [they] understood [this] instruction to
allow [a] conviction upon proof less than beyond a reasonable
doubt.”173

172. See Barkas, 99 N.E. at 702-03 (noting “The term ‘reasonable doubt’ has
no other or different meaning in law than it has when used in any of the
ordinary transactions or affairs of life. It is doubtful whether any better
definition of the term can be found than the words themselves.”).
173. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 2 (1994) (holding “The Constitution
does not dictate that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury
of the government’s burden of proof, so long as taken as a whole, the instructions
correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt.”).
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